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College-bound students in Japan undergo a process of intense preparation known as examination hell.  An 
extreme manifestation of examination hell is the ronin phenomenon.  Typically thirty percent of students choose 
the ronin option under which they spend years in addition to high school preparing for the next year’s college 
entrance examinations.  Using the mean scores of the entrance examinations as a measure of college quality, I 
find that college quality significantly improves the internal rate of return (IRR) to college education among the 
sample of male graduates in Japan.  Ronin increases earnings indirectly by improving the quality of the college 
attended.  I also show that the IRR with respect to ronin is one of diminishing returns.  On average, the number 
of ronin years which maximizes the IRR is found to be somewhere between one and two years. 
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1.  Introduction 
  In Japan, the high value placed on college prestige leads to intense competition among 
high school students to enter top colleges.  These students undergo a phase termed 
examination hell in which they cram to prepare for the annual college entrance examinations.  
An extreme manifestation of examination hell is the ronin phenomenon.  When students are 
not accepted into the college of choice, they may repeat the process under ronin status.  Ronin 
students spend an additional year, or as many years as it may take to enter the college of their 
choice, and often attend specialized college entrance preparatory schools.  The proportion of 
students entering college with ronin experience averages about 30 percent, and may even 
exceed 60 percent among the top colleges.  
The incentives of examination hell can only be explained under a system that rewards 
individuals as a function of college quality.  Certain institutions are more preferred than 
others because they are judged to be of higher quality and improve the economic 
advancement of their graduates.  If college quality didn’t matter, then students would be 
indifferent about which colleges to attend.  Competition to enter colleges would equalize 
across colleges to the point where examination hell would cease to exist, ronin would be 
considered irrational behavior, and the supplementary education business would go bust.  But 
such scenarios depart from reality.  Examination hell intensified and the supplementary 
education business flourished in the postwar period, and substantial household resources 
continue to be allocated towards the pursuit of college prestige in Japan. 
  The considerable investment undertaken in examination hell warrants a cost-benefit 
investigation to evaluate the investment criteria of college education in Japan.  While previous 
studies have focused primarily on the benefits side (e.g. Ono, 2004a), the costs associated 
with examination hell are often overlooked in the literature.  As suggested by Prest and Turley 
(1965), the advantage of cost-benefit analysis is “that it forces those responsible to quantify   2
costs and benefits as far as possible rather than rest content with vague qualitative judgments 
or personal hunches… (and) that it has the very valuable by-product of causing questions to 
be asked … which would otherwise not have been raised” (p.730).  The reality is that 
examination hell is a fact of life and an institutionalized process in Japan.  But the obvious 
question – does examination hell pay off? – remains unanswered.  The paucity of empirical 
research requires an estimation method that quantifies the costs and benefits of examination 
hell in a unifying framework. 
  In this paper, I conduct a cost-benefit analysis of college education in Japan using a 
1995 representative sample of Japanese male college graduates.  I estimate the returns to 
ronin investments because ronin is a definitive feature of examination hell, and because the 
costs and benefits associated with ronin can be assessed with relative accuracy with regards to 
both time and money units.  College quality is measured by the mean scores on entrance 
examinations administered by each college.  Central to the analysis is understanding the 
causal structure underlying ronin, college quality and earnings.  If the motive of ronin is to be 
admitted to a college of higher quality, and an improvement in college quality raises earnings, 
then the process in which ronin affects earnings must be modeled as a two-stage process.  On 
the other hand, if ronin affects earnings regardless of college quality, then the process can be 
examined using standard OLS.  This paper will examine both possibilities. 
  
2.  Examination hell and the pursuit of college quality in Japan 
2.1.  The examination 
  In Japan, admission into college requires students to successfully pass the entrance 
examinations administered by each institution.  Examination hell, which refers to students’ 
cramming and preparing in order to pass these examinations, is an expression common to all 
households with college-bound children.  Unlike in Western societies where factors such as   3
high school performance and extracurricular activities are considered in the admission process, 
college admission in Japan is determined almost entirely by performance in entrance 
examinations.
1  Hence there is enormous pressure for students to successfully pass the 
examinations.  Although the oft-cited correlation between examination hell and youth suicide 
is unfounded (Tsukada, 1991), cramming and other extreme measures are common features of 
the preparation stage, and continues to attract considerable attention among Western scholars.  
For example, Rohlen (1983) writes: 
 
The extent to which some will go in order to prepare is awesome.  And the 
extent to which some parents will encourage or permit the sacrifice of time 
and money to this undertaking is truly frightening.  What Americans regard as 
the lunatic fringe – students memorizing whole English dictionaries or doing 
seven hours of preparation a night for a year – actually sets the pace in this 
sort of competition. (p.106) 
 
  The investments undertaken in examination hell are substantial.  Many students do not 
get accepted to the school of their choice on their first attempt.  Some 30 percent of these 
students will continue under ronin status.   These ronin students spend additional years 
preparing for the entrance examinations after high school graduation, often attending 
specialized college preparatory schools.
2  The supplementary education industry in Japan 
expanded gradually in the postwar period reaching a market volume of 2.5 trillion yen in 1995, 
or approximately one percent of GDP (Figure 1).  The top firms in the industry are now listed 
in the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  Secular trends show that the proportion of household 
expenditures spent on supplementary education has grown steadily in the postwar period 
(Figure 1).  This increase can be explained partly by the second baby boom, and the rise in 
household income which increased demand for educational services (Blumenthal, 1992).   
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE   4
 
 The  motivations  underlying  examination hell can only be explained under a labor 
market that rewards workers depending on the quality of the college that they attended:  If all 
workers were rewarded equally regardless of college quality, then there would be no incentive 
to invest in college quality.  Hence there is good reason to expect that graduation from the 
prestigious colleges is linked to higher labor market rewards. 
 
2.2.  The rankings 
In Japan, the issue of who graduated from where is a national obsession.  Articles 
that feature personnel moves among important persons – whether they be in politics, 
government or the private sector – will be sure to report which schools they graduated from.  
As Dore (1973) explains, “it is not so much important to get into a university as important to 
get to the right university” (p.294).  There are numerous publications that rank universities 
along dimensions of difficulty in admission and successful outcome of their graduates.  With 
respect to the former, the most famous is the annual publication by Obunsha, which ranks 
Japanese universities by the mean scores of their entrance examination scores.  The first 
column of Table 1 shows the ranking of the top ten Japanese universities according to this 
scale.  The ronin rate is the proportion of incoming students who have at least one year of 
ronin experience.  Because these are the most prestigious and desirable universities in Japan, 
it is not surprising that the ronin rate among the top schools is significantly higher than the 
national average of 30 percent. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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In addition, there are various publications that tabulate the number of executives, 
politicians and bureaucrats by their graduating institutions on an annual basis.  The right two 
columns of Table 1 show a snapshot of such rankings commonly reported in the media:  The 
number of chief executive officers (CEOs) among companies listed in the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, and the number of politicians and high-level bureaucrats.   
Although not shown here, what is striking about the CEO ranking is that 49 percent 
are graduates from the top five, and 63 percent are graduates from the top ten universities.  
Given that there are more than 600 universities in Japan, the fact that half of all CEOs are 
graduates of only the top five universities is compelling evidence that university credentials 
matter greatly in Japanese society.  Undoubtedly, educational credentials are key determinants 
of success in other societies, but to a lesser extent.  For example, comparable estimates 
suggest that the graduates of the top five universities comprise just 16.7 percent of managers 
and directors among U.S. corporations.
3  A study of Fortune 100 companies by Cappelli and 
Hamori (2004) shows that the proportion of executives who graduated from an Ivy League 
institution (as their first degree institution) was 10 percent in 2001. 
Empirical studies have also documented the benefits of educational prestige in the 
Japanese labor market.  Graduates of higher-ranking colleges achieve higher earnings (Ono, 
2004a); they are also more likely to be selected from the labor queue for primary (versus 
secondary) employment (Sakamoto and Powers, 1995), to be employed by prestigious firms 
(Abe, 1997; Higuchi, 1994), and to reach upper management positions (Ishida, Spilerman, 
and Su, 1997).   
In sum, college prestige is highly valued in Japan.  Clearly the labor market is 
structured to reward individuals according to college quality.  The benefits from graduating 
prestigious universities are generous enough to motivate students to invest in examination hell.  
These investments in time and money terms are substantial.  The central question that   6
motivates my empirical analysis becomes the following:  Does examination hell pay off in the 
end, after all the costs and benefits are accounted for? 
 
3.  Ronin, college quality and earnings 
  I undertake cost-benefit analysis of college education in Japan by estimating the 
internal rate of return (IRR).  The IRR to college education is derived by equating the net 
present value of the costs and benefits over the lifetime.  I first calculate the total annual cost 
of college education by summing its direct costs (d) and indirect costs, where the latter are 
estimated by the earnings of high school graduates (Yh) who have been in the labor force for s 
years.  The total annual cost of college education in year s of college is expressed as (Yh+d)s.  
The benefit from college education in any given year of work experience (x) is the difference 
in earnings between college and high school graduates of the same age expressed as (Y – Yh)x.  
Total costs and benefits are discounted to the year in which the college graduate enters the 
labor market at x = 0.  The net present value (NPV) of investments in college education is: 
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where n is the year of work experience when individuals retire.  Two interpretations can be 
derived from the NPV.  First, we can estimate NPV using the predetermined market discount 
rate in place of a in the equation.  In this case, the so-called “decision rule” (Willis and Rosen 
1979) maintains that college investment is deemed worthwhile if the estimated NPV is 
positive.  And second, we can derive the IRR by setting NPV = 0.  Under this formulation, the 
IRR is the discount rate which sets NPV = 0.
4 
  Ronin is a special case in which the timing of labor market entry is delayed by the 
number of years spent under ronin status.  Consequently, this has the effect of prolonging the   7
period in which costs are incurred, and shortening the duration in which benefits can be 
accrued, which therefore depresses the IRR, ceteris paribus.  The benefits and costs of ronin 
can be expressed by the following equation: 
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where r is the number of years spent under ronin status and Y
* is the earnings of ronin.
5  In 
order for the ronin individual to have the same IRR as their non-ronin counterparts, the 
following condition must hold:
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The ‘premium’ from ronin experience (Y
*– Y) is the benefit in earnings obtained from ronin 
experience in addition to what the individual would have earned had he not experienced 
ronin.  Since the total cost of ronin is always greater than zero, equation (3) implies that ronin 
individuals must not only earn more (Y
* > Y) but that the sum of the discounted ‘premium’ 
from ronin experience must be greater than or equal to the sum of its discounted costs to be 
deemed a worthwhile investment.  Note that the indirect cost of ronin is now the earnings of 
college graduates (and not high school graduates).  Thus equation (3) points to two important 
implications:  (i) The marginal cost of ronin increases at an increasing rate because foregone 
earnings become more expensive, and (ii) The pure effect (and not the total effect; see 
discussion below) of ronin on IRR is negative ceteris paribus, because the cost of ronin is 
always higher than the cost of no ronin. 
 The  motivations  underlying  ronin behavior can be summarized as follows:   8
 
(i)  Individuals invest in ronin because they believe it will improve the quality of 
the college that they attend. 
 
(ii)  The improvement in college quality will subsequently lead to higher payoffs. 
 
The effect of ronin (r) on earnings (Y) is therefore a two-stage process which is mediated 
through college quality (Q).  There is also a third possibility, the direct (or pure) effect of 
ronin, in which: 
 
(iii) Ronin affects earnings independent of college quality. 
 
The two-stage process can be expressed in functional form as: 
 
  Y = f(r, Q) (4a) 
  Q = g(r) (4b) 
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The total effect of ronin on earnings is the sum of the direct effect of ronin on earnings 
([=∂Y/∂r] corresponding to [iii]) plus the indirect effect, which is the product of the ronin 
effect on college quality ([= dQ/dr] corresponding to [i]) times the effect of college quality on 
earnings ([= ∂Y/∂Q] corresponding to [ii]).  Capturing the ronin effects on earnings therefore 
requires specifying a system of structural equations.  The empirical strategy will be discussed 
in the methods section. 
  In equation (5), ∂Y/∂Q is always positive.  This has been established by previous 
studies (see earlier discussion) and I take this as a given.  From this it follows that dQ/dr must   9
also be positive.  This is the essence of the incentive structure underlying examination hell.  
Ronin improves the probability of getting accepted into colleges of higher Q, and higher Q 
leads to higher earnings.
7  To further illustrate this point, suppose that dQ/dr = 0.  Then the 
benefits of ronin are reduced to its pure effect (∂Y/∂r).  This does not imply that the pure 
effect of ronin must be zero.  However, this scenario departs from reality, because it implies 
that individuals invest in ronin regardless of the quality of the college that they attend.  
 The  IRR can likewise be expressed as a function of Q and r where the total change in 
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∂IRR/∂r is the direct (or pure) effect of ronin on IRR (or the effect of r on IRR controlling for 
Q) which is always negative, because the cost of ronin is always larger than the cost of no 
ronin.
8 ∂IRR/∂Q is the pure effect of Q on IRR (or the effect of Q on IRR controlling for r) 








 which must be positive as long as dQ/dr > 0.  This is another way of saying that 
the benefits of ronin are manifested as an indirect effect vis-à-vis improvements in Q.   
  Several important implications can be drawn from equation (6).  First, if dQ/dr = 0 







:  If r had no impact on Q, then the total effect of r on IRR is simply 
equal to its pure effect which is always negative.  Under this scenario, no individual would 
have the incentive to invest in ronin.  Second, if for some unlikely reason, ∂IRR/∂r > 0, then 
all individuals will have the incentive to invest in ronin even if dQ/dr = 0.  And third,   10
equation (6) can be rewritten in the form of a decision rule which stipulates that ronin is a 
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4.  Data and methods 
  The dataset used for the analysis is the 1995 Social Stratification and Mobility 
National Survey (hereafter SSM) which consists of men and women between the ages of 20 
and 70 residing in Japan in 1995.  My analysis is restricted to men.  Given the intermittent 
career mobility patterns of Japanese women, it is difficult to obtain reliable rate of return 
estimations for women.  An accurate analysis of women’s returns to college education would 
require that they be analyzed separately.  College graduates consist of graduates of four-year 
universities.  Graduates of junior college and graduate school were excluded because these 
educational institutions do not have comparable college quality scores as the four-year 
institutions.  The resulting sample size is 697, consisting of 475 high school graduates and 
222 college graduates.  Descriptive statistics are reported in the Appendix. 
  SSM is particularly suited for the purpose of my research because it reports the name 
of the college for respondents who attended college.  College quality is measured by the mean 
scores on entrance examinations administered by each college as reported by Obunsha.
9  The 
advantage of treating college quality as a continuous variable is that it allows us to estimate 
marginal effects or elasticities, which widens the implications of my findings and facilitates 
post-regression estimations and simulations.  A majority of earlier studies have used discrete 
categories of colleges due mainly to data limitations.  Given our full range of college quality 
scores, any attempt to collapse colleges into pre-specified categories would be arbitrary.  
Moreover, I would lose valuable information in the process, and I avoid doing this.   11
  The reliability of the SSM earnings data as a representative sample of Japanese male 
workers has been documented by Yano (1998), who compared the SSM data with actual 
earnings reported in the Ministry of Labor’s publication, Basic Wage Survey.  Based on 
Mincerian estimation results, Yano shows that the SSM earnings data provide estimates that 
conform very closely to those obtained from the Basic Wage Survey and suggests that the 
SSM earnings data are indeed “useful.”  My estimation results should therefore not be a 
misrepresentation of the Japanese labor force. 
  Ronin is not directly reported in the SSM, so the following coding procedure was 
employed.  I assume that college students attend college for four years, and begin working 
immediately after college graduation.  These are not unreasonable assumptions given that 
repeating a grade in college and taking time off after college graduation are rare occurrences 
in Japan.  Unlike the college system in the U.S. and other Western countries, all college 
students in Japan must remain in school for at least four years regardless of their performance, 
and nearly all complete college education in exactly four years.
10  The number of years spent 
in ronin status is coded as the difference in years between the age at which the individual 
entered college and the age at which he started working after graduation minus four years.
11  
This coding procedure resulted in a small number of individuals with ronin years greater than 
three.  For analytical convenience, these individuals were categorized in the ronin 3+ category.   
  I assume that individuals retire at the age of 60.
12  Expected working life is 38 for 
graduates who attended four years of college and began working at the age of 22, and 42 for 
high school graduates.  Expected working life for ronin is adjusted accordingly.  Benchmark 
interest rates for IRR evaluation for fiscal year 1995 are provided in Table 2.
13 
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  Following our previous discussion, the internal rate of return will be estimated for 
each male college graduate in the SSM survey by solving for IRR in the following equation: 
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In equation (7), di is the direct cost associated with college education specific to college 
graduate i, and Yi,x is his reported annual earnings at x years of work experience.   x h Y ,  is the 
experience-earnings profile of the “average” high school graduate, which becomes the 
indirect cost of college education on the right hand side of equation (7).  The costs associated 
with college and ronin used in the estimations are reported in the Appendix. 
  Several limitations of my analysis are pointed out as follows.  First, I assume that 
individuals are risk neutral, and undertake investments in human capital with reasonable 
certainty about their future earnings and employment outcomes.  Second, rate of return 
estimations using cross-sectional data assume a constant experience-education-earnings 
relationship over time, which may underestimate lifetime earnings by education during 
periods of economic growth (Cohn and Geske, 1986).  Third, rates of return are limited to 
monetary benefits.  Non-monetary benefits may include certain non-financial advantages that 
accrue from college education, e.g. improved sorting in the marriage market through positive 
assortative mating (Becker, Landes, and Michael, 1977).  I do not account for such benefits 
due to the difficulty of quantifying their worth.  Fourth, I use the self-assessed grade point 
average (GPA) in ninth grade (= last year of middle school in Japan) as a proxy for individual 
ability.  The usual caveats for self-assessed ability measures apply (see for example Maxwell 
and Lopus [1994]).  And fifth, the earnings function approach may overstate the returns to 
education.  I control for individual ability to reduce the non-schooling bias (following 
Griliches and Mason [1972]), but I cannot rule out the possibility that differences in other   13
non-schooling attributes between high-school and college graduates, or among college 
graduates of differing college quality may account for some of the differences in the returns to 
college education. 
 
5.  Ronin, college quality and the internal rate of return:  Is ronin a good investment? 
  I formulate a series of equations to estimate the effects of college quality and ronin 
on earnings.  Table 3 reports the results using OLS.  All models control for experience and 
experience squared but their output is suppressed in the table.  The variable for years of 
education is not included because the current sample concerns only college graduates.  I find 
some evidence of ronin effect on earnings (Column 1), but this effect disappears after 
controlling for college quality (Column 3).  On the other hand, the college quality effect on 
earnings is positive and significant (Columns 2 and 3).  The coefficient for Q in Column 2 is 
the marginal effect of college quality on earnings, from which we observe that a unit increase 
in college quality leads to a 1.9 percent increase in earnings. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
I next calculate the internal rate of return (IRR) given the coefficients estimated from 
Model 2 of Table 3.  I first estimate the experience-earnings profiles as a function of college 
quality, at the mean, minimum and maximum values of Q.  The earnings profile for high 
school graduates is illustrated in the graph as a reference category (Figure 2).  The earnings 
profiles for college graduates show that the payoffs from college quality are generous, and the 
IRR estimations confirm this (Table 4).  The IRR ranges from a low of 0.1 percent to a high of 
14.0 percent as a function of college quality.  The mean IRR of 6.4 percent outperforms the 
benchmark rates reported in Table 2 and confirms that college education is still a sound   14
investment.  The results indicate that an increase in college quality from one standard 
deviation (about 6.4 points) below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean raises 
the IRR to college education from 3.6 to 9.2 percent.  The results confirm the significant 
impact of college quality in Japan. 
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  A shortcoming of the OLS estimation is that the causal structure underlying ronin, 
college quality and earnings cannot be properly specified.  I next consider an instrumental 
variables (IV) approach which takes the following form: 
  
  4 4 ε γ + + = Xf r Q  (8a) 
  3 3 ˆ ln ε ω + + = Zh Q Y  (8b) 
 
where X and Z are vector of covariates that are included in the equations.  In equation (8b), 
ω3 is now the effect of Q on lnY purged of the stochastic disturbance of ε4.  By substituting 
equation (8a) into equation (8b), we obtain the total effect or r on lnY. 
Since selection into ronin and into higher and lower quality colleges is not random, 
two instruments are necessary to answer both questions posed.  Individuals pursue higher 
quality college education because they believe that it will improve their rewards in the future.  
The first-stage equation which predicts college quality must therefore include:  (i) The same 
variables included in the earnings equation; (ii) Variables that are correlated with college 
quality, in this case individual ability proxied by grade point average (GPA) in ninth-grade; 
and, (iii) An instrument which is correlated with college quality but not with earnings.  In this   15
case, I use supplementary education during middle school as an instrument.  This variable is 
coded one if the respondent received any form of supplementary education during elementary 
school and middle school (e.g. tutoring, cram schools) and zero if he did not.  The variable is 
highly correlated with college quality with a partial F significant at .01, while its correlation 
with earnings is low with a partial F significance level of .70.  The coefficient for 
supplementary education in the college quality equation is actually negative (Table 5).  This 
result may seem counterintuitive, but it is consistent with past findings (see for example, 
Seiyama and Noguchi, 1984).   Since the competition into college intensifies in high school, 
supplementary education during elementary school and middle school may not necessarily 
have the desired effect of improving the chances of successful entry into college.  Indeed, 
many students engage in supplementary education during middle school simply as an 
“insurance” or because their friends and colleagues did so (Blumenthal, 1992; Rohlen, 1983).  
My analysis suggests that this insurance did not pay off. 
  The above formulation rests on the assumption that selection into ronin status is a 
random process.  However, individuals choose the ronin option should they decide ex-ante 
that ronin will improve their future earnings, more so than if they went straight to college.  I 
consider this possibility and estimate a separate equation in order to establish the selection 
criteria of individual’s advancement into ronin status.  This equation (hereafter the ronin 
equation) must incorporate the same variables as specified in the earnings equation, since the 
variables that determine one’s future earnings are the same variables that motivate ronin 
investments.  Predicted ronin status is then entered into the first-stage equation to predict 
college quality.  In this case, I use a binary ronin variable as the outcome – zero for non-ronin 
and one for any ronin – given the relatively few number of students with ronin experiences of 
more than one year.  The results of the probit equation are reported in the Appendix. 
Selection into ronin also requires a valid instrument which is correlated with ronin but   16
not with earnings.  Such an instrument may be costs of or access to ronin resources.  The 
instrument chosen for this purpose is the average quality of colleges within the respondent’s 
prefecture of origin (= prefecture in which the respondent resided prior to college entry).  
Following Ono (2004b), I constructed the average college quality variable for each prefecture 
by taking the average of the examination scores for all colleges located within that prefecture.  
The effect of this variable was found to be significant in the ronin equation, but not in the 
earnings equation.  This makes sense because examination hell is likely to be more intense in 
regions endowed with higher quality colleges, and these regions are also better endowed with 
“examination hell resources” such as college preparatory schools and other types of 
supplementary education (Ono 2004b). 
  Table 5 reports the results of the IV estimations.  The first-stage regressions predict 
college quality given ronin, and the IV (or the second-stage) regressions predict earnings 
given college quality.  First, we find that ronin significantly improves college quality, but at a 
diminishing rate (Column 1).  Column 2 reports the estimation results using predicted ronin.  
The results also confirm that ronin boosts college quality.  And finally, the IV regressions 
confirm that college quality significantly improves earnings. 
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Table 6 reports the internal rates of return estimated using the coefficients obtained 
from Table 5.  The results suggest that ronin is generally a good investment, but subject to the 
risk of overinvestment.  Ronin improves IRR but at a diminishing rate.  The optimal 
investment in ronin – or the years of ronin in which the ronin premium is maximized – is 
somewhere between one and two years.  In comparison to the no-ronin group, the mean IRR 
is higher among the ronin 1 year and 2 year groups but lower among the ronin 3+ group.
14    17
The ‘premium’ from ronin investments – the difference in IRR between the ronin versus the 
no-ronin group – is therefore positive for the first two years of ronin, but negative for three 
years and beyond.  The IRR using the predicted ronin method (or the binary ronin category) 
was also estimated substituting ronin = 2 years as the approximate mean years of ronin.  
Internal rates of return were found to be 5.1 percent for the non-ronin group, and 6.8 percent 
for the ronin group. 
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6.  Simulations 
Using the formulas and coefficients obtained from my analysis, we can apply the 
decision rule to simulate the change in college quality required from ronin which will make 
the ronin investment worthwhile, that is:  If an individual were to invest in ronin, then what is 
the increase in college quality (say dQ*) that he must achieve which will make his ronin 
investment break even?  This question can be answered by applying the decision rule and 
solving for dQ*/dr which sets the ronin premium equal to zero, i.e. we set marginal benefit 
equal to marginal cost (dIRR/dr = 0), such that equation (6’) can be expressed: 
 
  0 =
dr
dIRR













*  (9) 
 
Table 7 and Figure 3 show the results of the simulations.  The actual changes in Q 
from my previous estimations are reported for reference.  Since the current exercise requires 
discrete units of ronin years, I conduct the analysis using the three category distinction of 
ronin.  The required changes in Q are by definition the break-even points, or the change in Q 
which sets the ronin premium equal to zero.  Therefore, individuals must improve their Q by   18
at least this much in order to make their ronin investment break even.  For example, (from 
Table 7) ronin one-year students must improve their Q by at least 2.05 points.  Otherwise, 
their ronin premium will be negative.  Since dQ > dQ* for both the ronin one year and two 
year categories, their ronin premium is positive. 
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In Figures 2 (a) and (b), the distance between the actual and the required change in Q 
illustrates the magnitude of the ronin premium:  the larger the distance between the two points 
the larger the premium.  For the ronin 3 year category, dQ < dQ* so the ronin premium is 
negative.  These individuals required an improvement in Q of at least 6.33 points to break 
even, but their actual improvement was only 5.96, hence resulting in a negative premium.  
This is also seen in Figure 3 (a) where the actual change in Q lies below its required change. 
  From Table 7, we can see that dQ/dr diminishes as r increases (d
2Q/dr
2 < 0) while the 
reverse holds true for dQ*/dr (d
2Q*/dr
2 > 0).  This relationship is illustrated in Figure 3 (b) 
where dQ/dr is shown to be concave, dQ*/dr to be convex, and maximization occurs at the 
point where the distance between the two curves is largest.  In other words, while the actual 
relationship between r and Q is one of diminishing returns, from an investment perspective, it 
must be one of increasing returns, because the marginal cost curve is upward sloping but the 
marginal benefit curve is downward sloping.  The annual cost of ronin for a student going 
into his third year of ronin for example, is more ‘expensive’ than the annual cost of a student 
who is going into his second year of ronin, because opportunity cost for the former is greater.  
Given ∂
2IRR/∂r
2 > 0, it follows from equation (9) that d
2Q*/dr
2 > 0; as students undergo more 
years of ronin, they must increase their Q at an increasing rate.   19
  A number of simulations can be performed using the decision rule to evaluate the 
returns to ronin investments.  One possibility is to relax the assumption that all individuals 
retire at the age of 60, and examine the effect of different retirement ages on the IRR.  
Alternatively, we may estimate how young an individual could retire and ronin still be 
worthwhile.  We may simulate changes in IRR under different specifications of costs.  Such 
simulations would have valuable implications not only for individuals, but also for educators 
and policymakers. 
 
7.  Summary and discussion 
Examination hell refers to the competitive environment under which students cram 
and compete to gain entry into the preferred colleges in Japan.  Examination hell is motivated 
by the hierarchical ranking of Japanese colleges, and the generous benefits associated with 
graduation from the elite institutions.  If students are not accepted on their first attempt, they 
may repeat the process under ronin status, and spend an additional year, or as many years as it 
may take to enter the college of their choice.  The enormous investment undertaken in 
examination hell warrants a cost-benefit analysis that quantifies the costs and benefits in a 
unifying framework.   
  My research clearly shows that graduates from higher quality colleges achieve higher 
earnings.  I find that the internal rate of return (IRR) to college education in Japan varies 
considerably as a function of college quality, ranging from 0.1 to 14 percent (with mean of 
6.4 percent). 
 On  average,  examination hell does pay off, when evaluated by the returns to ronin 
investments.  My OLS results show that the direct effect of ronin on earnings is weak.  When 
ronin is modeled using instrumental variables regression, I find that ronin increases earnings 
indirectly through its improvement in college quality.  This makes sense because individuals   20
invest in ronin for the sake of improving the quality of the college that they attend, which 
subsequently leads to higher earnings.  The IRR with respect to ronin peaks somewhere 
between one and two years of ronin.  Hence, ronin is generally a good investment, but subject 
to the risk of overinvestment. 
 Although  ronin may bestow benefits for individuals, the social implications are not so 
optimistic.  Considering that one-third of the college-bound population undergoes a 
moratorium of at least one year, the social cost resulting from the lost output is substantial.  It 
is therefore not surprising that the Education Ministry views ronin as a social problem.  An 
extension to the current research would be to investigate the existence and magnitude of the 
negative externalities associated with the ronin phenomenon. 
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Appendix 
Estimation of costs associated with college education 
  The annual direct cost of college education was estimated as tuition minus part-time 
earnings in 1995 (Ministry of Education statistics).  Ronin cost was estimated as the average 
cost of college preparation schools and other supplementary education expenditures based on 
data provided by Sakurai (1997) and Stevenson and Baker (1992).  Part-time earnings of 
ronin students were assumed to be zero since ronin students are assumed to be preparing full-
time for the college entrance examinations, and it is unlikely that these individuals held part-
time jobs.  Financial aid and scholarships in Japan are rare and were not accounted for in the 
estimations.  A small percentage of students receive some type of financial assistance, but   21
they are only offered in the form of interest-free loans that require repayment (see Japan 
Student Services Organization homepage for further description:  http://www.jasso.go.jp/). 
  Indirect costs of college education were estimated from the standardized experience-
earnings profile for male high-school graduates generated from the following equation (N = 
475, R
2 = .192). 
 
 ln  Y = 14.412 +.065x – .001x
2 +  .057GPA 
 (.104)  (.008)  (1.71E-4)  (.023) 
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Notes
                                                 
1 In recent years, Japanese universities have increased the proportion of students admitted 
through recommendations (suisen nyugaku) and have started to introduce admissions 
procedures similar to the U.S. where applicants are evaluated on the basis of their high-school 
performance and activities.  However, these proportions are still small.  For example, 
according to the 1997 Obunsha publication, the proportion of applicants accepted through 
recommendation at Waseda University and Keio University were 8 percent and 3 percent, 
respectively.  For the 1945 to 1991 cohort of applicants covered in the current study, these 
proportions are even smaller.  Hence, I assume in this study that the majority of the students 
entered universities through the entrance examinations. 
2 Ronin originally refers to a masterless samurai in feudal Japan.  In contemporary terms, 
ronin refers to students who aspire to universities but do not have an affiliation, i.e. they 
belong to neither high schools nor universities. 
3 This proportion was estimated from an unpublished draft of Useem and Karabel (1986), 
cited in Ishida (1993).  The proportion of managers and directors from the top 11 institutions 
is 22.5 percent according to Useem and Karabel’s data. 
4 From equation (1) it is clear that IRR will vary depending on the value of n, while the costs 
associated with college are sunk costs incurred over s years and independent of n.  However, 
some individuals may choose to work longer than others (i.e. choose different values of n) so 
that they can recoup the benefits over a longer time span, thereby offsetting the proportion of 
benefits over costs. Individuals choose to retire at different ages for various reasons, but it is 
difficult to account for such individual variations in IRR estimations.  Following convention, I 
assume that n is fixed for all individuals. 
5 For simplicity, equation (2) assumes that the annual direct cost associated with ronin is 
equivalent to college tuition.  In reality, the direct cost of ronin such as yobiko (or preparatory 
school) expenditures are likely to be smaller than tuition.  I account for the differences in 
costs in the internal rate of return estimations (see following section). 
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from which we obtain equation (3) by combining the two terms on the right hand side (note 
that Yh drops out of the equation). 
7 Another way to see this is simply that r and Q are positively correlated, which is consistent 
with the evidence presented in Table 1 – higher quality colleges have a higher proportion of 
ronin students. 
8 ∂IRR/∂r < 0 does not imply that there are no pure benefits of ronin, but that the costs of 
ronin outweigh its benefits, if ronin had no effect on Q. 
9 The means score of entrance examinations are specific to the college, department of study, 
and entry year into college.  See Ono (2004a, 2004b) for description of coding procedure. 
10 For example, in 1995, 95 percent of college students graduated in exactly four years 
(Ministry of Education statistics). 
11 The SSM survey includes the year and month of the respondents’ birth.  Because the cutoff 
date for the new academic year is March 31 in Japan, I sorted the respondents’ age of 
graduation accordingly.  I eliminated college graduates from the prewar period because the 
prewar system of higher education required different durations of middle school, high school 
and college which will lead to mismeasurement of the IRR.   
12 The mandatory retirement age has been raised gradually in response to the aging population.  
In 1995, 80 percent of Japanese firms set the mandatory retirement at age 60.  In 2000, this 
proportion was 92 percent (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare statistics). 
13 One should be reminded that interest rates in Japan have declined precipitously in the 1990s 
to reach an unprecedented low in recent years.  Hence, the 1995 figures may not be the best 
investment criterion. 
14 For analytical convenience, I estimate the IRR for the ronin 3+ group assuming ronin years 
to be 3.   25
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1 Tokyo  51   Tokyo  Tokyo 
2 Kyoto  53   Keio (p)  Kyoto 
3 Hitotsubashi  -   Waseda (p)  Chuo (p) 
3 Keio  (p) 68    Kyoto  Waseda (p) 
5  Tokyo Univ of Foreign Studies  -    Hitotsubashi  Tohoku 
6 Ochanomizu  -   Nihon (p)  Hokkaido 
7 Osaka  44   Doshisha (p)  Keio (p) 
8 Nagoya  33   Tohoku  Nihon (p) 
9  Tokyo Institute of Technology  -    Kansai Gakuin (p)  Kyushu 
10 Waseda  (p) -    Chuo (p)  Hitotsubashi 
p: private universities 
a [SOURCE: Obunsha, 1986] 
b [SOURCE: Diamond, 1998] 
c [SOURCE: Toyo Keizai data, reprinted from Kawaijuku, 1996] 
 
 











1.00 2.91 1.63 2.60 
[SOURCE:  Bank of Japan statistics]
 
a In April 1995 
 
 
Table 3  The effects of ronin and college quality 
 on logged earnings 
 1   2    3   
Ronin 1 year  0.163 *     0.127   
 (0.072)       (0.071)   
Ronin 2 years  -0.021       -0.095  
 (0.096)       (0.096)   
Ronin 3+ years  0.325 **     0.230  
  (0.121)      (0.121)   
GPA  0.043  0.002  0.002   
  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.033)   
College quality     0.019 ** 0.017  ** 
    (0.005)  (0.005)   
Constant  14.497 ** 13.682 ** 13.734 ** 
  (0.139)  (0.254)  (0.260)   
         
R
2         0.494            0.502            0.523    
N  222  222    222   
* p<.05, ** p<.01. 
Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
All models control for experience and experience squared.   26
Table 4  Estimated IRR by university type and college quality [%] 




6.4                     0.1            14.0                   3.6                  9.2  
Estimated from Model 2, Table 3. 
 
 
Table 5  Ronin, college quality and earnings 
 1    2   
       
First-stage regressions (Dependent variable = College quality) 
       
Ronin 1 year  2.023*     
 (0.961)     
Ronin 2 years  4.473**     
 (1.295)     
Ronin 3+ years  4.720**     
 (1.642)     
Predicted ronin     6.410** 
     (1.010) 
GPA 2.342**  2.201** 
 (0.422)  (0.366) 
Supplementary education  -2.731**  -2.064** 
 (0.864)  (0.756) 
Constant 46.665**  46.141** 
 (2.015)  (1.744) 
R
2 0.304    0.357   
        
Instrumental-variables regressions (Dependent variable = Logged earnings) 
        
College quality  0.029*  0.029** 
 (0.013)  (0.008) 
GPA -0.027  -0.034 
 (0.048)  (0.035) 
Constant 13.223**  13.306** 
 (0.606)  (0.363) 
R
2  0.491  0.479   
N  222  222   
* p<.05, ** p<.01. 
Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
All regressions control for experience and experience squared. 
   27
 
Table 6  IRR as a function of ronin and university type [%] 
Ronin years  0  1  2  3+ 
IRR  5.3 5.7 6.0 5.2 
 
 
Table 7  Improvements in Q required to make ronin 
investments worthwhile 
Ronin years (r) 
1 2 3 
Actual (dQ)           2.67               5.51          5.96 
dQ/dr (2.67) (2.84) (0.45)
     
Required (dQ*)           2.05               4.15          6.33 
dQ*/dr  (2.05) (2.10) (2.18)
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Table A.1  Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean  S.D. 
High school graduates (N = 475)   
Experience 23.68  11.64   
GPA 3.05  1.04   
  
College graduates (N = 231)   
Experience 18.29  11.79   
GPA 4.00  0.94   
College quality (Q) 51.90  6.39   
Mean Q in respondent’s prefecture of origin  51.94  9.72  
Supplementary education  0.51  0.50  
Ronin 1 year  0.19  0.17  
Ronin 2 years  0.09  0.05  
Ronin 3+ years  0.09  0.05  
 
 
Table A.2  Tuition, part-time earnings and ronin costs 
in annual terms [UNIT: yen] 
Tuition  
   National universities  497,000 
   Private universities  1,095,300 
  
Part-time earnings   
   National university students  349,200 
   Private university students  412,200 
  
Ronin cost  350,000 
 
 
Table A.3  Ronin selection equation 
Variable Coef   
GPA -0.013 
 (0.101) 
College quality (Q) 0.042** 
 (0.015) 




    
Log-likelihood -149.1 
* p<.05, ** p<.01. 
Standard errors reported in parentheses. 















[SOURCE:  Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency; Ministry of Education] 
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